Criminal Law by Walterman, Edward
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 10 
Number 2 
Volume 10 Issues 2-3 





Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Walterman, Criminal Law, 10 U. Miami L. Rev. 198 (1956) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol10/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 






Two decisions handed down by the Florida Supreme Court sustaining
first degree murder convictions applied certain well accepted principles of
the felony murder rule. In both Henderson v. State' and Hornbeck v.
State,2 homicides were effected by a confederate of the accused while the
two were engaged in a robbery. Both cases involved prosecutions under
Section 782.04 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that "the unlawful
killing of a human being . . . when committed in the perpetration of or
in the attempt to perpetrate . . . any robbery . . . shall be murder in the
first degree." It was the accused's contention that under this section, only
the principal who fired the fatal shot could be convicted. The court, in
rejecting this contention, observed that, if the accused was actually or con-
structively present, aiding and abetting the robbery, and the "unlawful
killing was committed in the perpretration of the robbery, he is equally
guilty of the murder with the other principal, even though prior to the
robbery there was no premeditated design by either to commit a homicide."
In the Hornbeck case, the deceased was a police officer who was killed
at a time after the robbery had been completed and while he was attempt-
ing to arrest the defendant and his accomplice as they emerged from the
building. The defendant contended that Section 782.04 of the Florida
Statutes was not applicable because under that statute the person killed
must be the person upon whom the robbery is, or is attempted to be,
perpetrated. In rejecting this contention, the court observed that when
men engage in a scheme of robbery and arm themselves with loaded re-
volvers, they show that they expect to encounter forcible opposition and
that to overcome it they are prepared to kill anyone who stands in their
way. If, in the course of their felonious enterprise, they open deadly fire
upon policemen or others, and if, in the exchange of shots, someone is
killed, the conclusion is inescapable that the proximate cause of the killing
was the malicious criminal action of the felons. The further contention of
the defendant that the statute was not applicable because the robbery had
already been completed and that, therefore, the unlawful killing was not
committed "in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery,"
was likewise rejected; the court reasoned that the rule embodied in the statute
*The purpose of this article is to observe and analyze the important develop-
ments in the field of criminal law during the period from September 1953 to June 1955
(Volumes 66 through 80 of the Southern Reporter).
**Lecturer, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 77 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1954).
2. 77 So.Zd 876 (Fia. 1955).
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was broad enough to include homicides committed in an attempt to escape
from the scene of the crime, especially when that crime is robbery, since
the continuation of the use of arms which was necessary to aid the felon
in reducing the property to possession is further necessary to protect him
in its possession and in making good his escape.
In Mayo v. State,8 the defendant was convicted of the first degree
murder of a constable in a gun duel in which it was established that the
constable fired the first shot, at a time when he was not attempting to
make an arrest or act in any other official capacity. The prosecution had
relied upon a rather fanciful theory buttressed by a number of items of
circumstantial evidence to obtain the conviction. The Supreme Court
reversed and asserted that when circumstantial evidence is relied upon to
convict a person charged with a crime, the evidence must not only be
consistent with the defendant's guilt but must also be inconsistent with
any reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. Circumstantial evidence is
never sufficient to support a conviction where, assuming all to be proved
which the evidence tends to prove another hypothesis still may be true,
because it is the actual exclusion of each other hypothesis which clothes
mere circumstances with the force of proof. The court, in reversing the
conviction, observed that the theory of the state was not supported by
the record and was the product of mere speculation and guess work.
Second degree murder
In Coco v. State,4 in sustaining a conviction of second degree murder,
the court, although dealing primarily with problems of evidence, observed
that no motive need be proved to justify a verdict and implied that lack
of proof of motive would be material only in the event that circumstantial
evidence alone was relied upon to sustain the conviction. Since here
there was eye witness testimony of the fatal shooting, the element of motive
was immaterial.
Manslaughter
In the much publicized case of Tongay v. State,5 involving a prosecution
under Section 782.07 of the Florida Statutes concerning manslaughter, it
was established that the deceased, Kathy Tongay, five year old daughter
of the defendant, died from internal complications induced by traumatic
rupture of the small intestine caused when she dived from a board thirty-
three and a third feet high while being trained in diving by the defendant.
The evidence indicated she did not possess the experience, physical strength,
muscular co-ordination and skill to negotiate this kind of dive. The court
reasoned that appellant knew or should have known this and should not
3. 71 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1954).
4. 80 'So.2d 346 (Fla. 1955).
5. 79 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1955).
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have permitted zeal or obsession of making a high diver of his immature
child to cause him to lose or forget all sense of hazard and danger to her.
Justice Terrell, writing the opinion of the court, in affirming the conviction,
reviewed the evidence at some length, and concluded that the appellant's
conduct evidenced a reckless disregard of the child's safety in exposing
it to such dangerous consequences.
Miller v. State6 involved a prosecution for manslaughter arising out
of an automobile collision. The evidence was conflicting, but taken in the
light most favorable to the state, tended to show that the defendant,
while driving, had turned out to pass another vehicle and seeing that he
couldn't make it, crossed the road attempting to get to the ditch on the
other side. He collided with the automobile driven by the deceased,
coming from the opposite direction. The conviction was reversed, the
court concluding that defendant's conduct was not of such a gross and
flagrant nature, evincing a reckless disregard of human life or safety, so
as to raise a presumption of "conscious indifference to consequences."
ATTEMPTEiD KIDNAPPING
Stratton v. State7 dealt with the propriety of a conviction of the
defendant on two charges, one for assault with intent to rape and the
other for attempt to kidnap. The facts were that the defendant, who was
employed by the parents of the eight year old victim, broke into the
house at night and carried the girl from her bed on the second floor
to the stairway but dropped the child and ran when the mother was awak-
ened by the child's screams. The court reversed the conviction of assault
with intent to commit rape on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence
but sustained the conviction of attempted kidnapping, reasoning that in
view of the stealth employed by the intruder in his preparations and flight,
and his forcible removal of the child under the circumstances described,
there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury might lawfully find that
the defendant was guilty of an attempt to kidnap.
FORGERY
In Green v. State," the defendant was convicted of forgery. He had
represented to a jeweler that he had organized a baseball team known
as the "Gainesville All Stars" and that if the jeweler would contribute
funds for the purchase of uniforms, his name would be written across the
backs of the uniforms for advertising purposes. The jeweler gave the de-
fendant a check made payable to "Gainsvillc All Stars", and defendant
endorsed the check to "Gainsville All Stars" using the name of a fictitious
individual and cashed the check. The Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant was guilty under the forgery statute, Section' 831.01, Florida
6. 75 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1954g.
7. 77 So.2d 865 (Fla. 19551.
8. 76 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1954).
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Statutes. The court admitted that the immediate transaction between
the appellant, Green, and the jeweler, whereby Green received the check,
could be eliminated from consideration as a basis for forgery, except for
its bearing upon the later act of the defendant. The court further indi-
cated that had Green endorsed the check, using his own name, he could
not properly be held guilty of forgery. However, since he had used a
fictitious name in endorsing the check, the conviction was sustained. The
court explained that the intent element requisite in the definition of the
crime, to wit: "With intent to injure or defraud any person" was satisfied
here since Green, in signing a fictitious name, acted and intended to act
to the injury of the jeweler in making his own apprehension more difficult
after his deceit was discovered. The reasoning of the court in sustaining
the conviction appears to this writer to be extremely tenuous. It would
seem that the court would have been better advised to recognize the true
intent of the forgery statute, and to have insisted that the defendant be
held responsible for his fraud in obtaining the check.
LARCENY
In Cone v. State,9 the court applied the rule of "recent possession" to
sustain a conviction for larceny of an automobile despite the fact that the
automobile was not found at the defendant's home until nine months after
its disappearance. The evidence indicated it had been there in the de-
fendant's possession, continuously from the date of its disappearance, and




In a series of cases decided over the past two years, the Supreme Court
sought to clarify the law concerning searches and seizures incident to
arrest without a warrant, and to further explain the rules pertinent to the
admissibility of evidence seized.
In Courington v. State,1 the facts were as follows: the defendant
was involved in an automobile accident, and shortly after the accident a
deputy sheriff appeared on the scene. The deputy, after observing the
scene and the defendant, placed him under arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated. Shortly thereafter, certain witnesses to the accident advised the
deputy that the defendant had placed certain papers in the trunk of
the car, The deputy then searched the trunk of the vehicle and found
some punch boards, cash money in a paper sack and some tickets or slips
of paper which it is claimed, on the basis of expert testimony, were lottery
tickets. The defendant was charged and convicted of possession of gambling
implements. At the trial, the defendant sought unsuccessfully to suppress
9. 69 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1954).
10. 74 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the evidence found in the trunk of his car on the grounds that the search
and seizure was unlawful. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
observing that the search of the trunk of appellant's car was made without
a warrant and hence its legality hinged on whether or not it was incident
to a lawful arrest and appropriate to the reasonable requirements of making
effective a lawful arrest. The court concluded that under the facts of
the case the search of the trunk of defendant's car was not appropriately
incident to making effective a lawful arrest for driving while intoxicated.
In two cases involving the same problem, convictions were sustained
despite the defendants' contention that certain elements of the evidence
offered at the trial had been unlawfully obtained.
In Baglio v. State," the defendant was convicted of grand larceny.
She had been observed standing in the show window of the prosecuting
witness' jewelry store and, when spoken to, ran out of the store followed
by the prosecuting witness, whose cries for help caused a policeman to
join in the chase. When the defendant was cornered in an alley, she
threw her bag at the policeman saying, "You have the bag, let me go."
In the response to the question by him, "is it all here?", she stated, "Yes,
let me go now, please." The policeman examined the contents of the bag
and found some of the jewelry belonging to the prosecuting witness. The
motion to suppress the evidence found in the bag was denied. On appeal,
the Supreme Court concluded that the arrest of the defendant, without
warrant, was reasonable and the subsequent search of the handbag was
not unreasonable and the evidence obtained from it was admissible in
evidence. The Court rejected defendant's contention that the polieman
did not have proper or reasonable cause to arrest under the circumstances.
The other case, Irvin v. State,12 involved a prosecution for rape. There,
the deputy sheriff, having arrested the defendant and taken him to jail,
returned to the home of the defendant and asked the defendant's mother
for the shoes and trousers he had worn the night before. Without
reluctance, she entered the boy's room followed by the officer, secured
the clothing and shoes and delivered them to him, It was insisted by
the defendant that the occurrence amounted to an unlawful search, particu-
larly since the room occupied by the defendant was one for which he paid
his mother a stipulated amount weekly. The court rejected that contention
concluding that the facts in this case are devoid of any element of unlawful
search or seizure. The defendant had told the officer that the clothes
that he had been wearing were at his home. The officer had gone there
and, without more display of authority than his presence, "politely" asked
the man's mother for the clothes. She produced them without protest
and the officer received them without any exploitation whatever. This
11. 75 So,2d 218 (Fla. 1954).
12. 66 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
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conduct was held not to violate the constitutional guarantee against unlawful
s-carches and seizures.
However, in two "moonshine" cases decided by the court, convictions
were rcvcrsed because illegally obtained evidence was employed by the
prosecution at the trial. In Melton v. State,"' the arresting officer, having
good cause to suspect that the dcfcndant was unlawfully in posscssion of
"moonshine" whiskey in her home, obtained a search warrant (which was
subsequently determined to be invalid) and, UpOn cntcring thc housc,
discovered the whiskey in a cache under the floor. Whereupon, the defen-
dant was arrested and charged with the unlawful possession. A conviction
followed a trial at which, though the search warrant had already bccn
declared invalid, the trial judge admitted the "moonshine" into evidcnce.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, observing that since the
warrant was invalid, the only way the evidence obtained bv the search
could properly he used would be if it had been seized pursuant to a lawful
arrest. The arresting officer testified that the defcndant was arrested after
lie discovered the "moonshine"; the court assumed, therefore, that he did
not intcud to make an arrest unless he discovered it. The court concluded
that the seizure was not incident to a lawful arrest.
In Byrd v. State,14 the sheriff, having rcccived a "tip" that the dcfcndant
had a truck full of "moonshine", followed the truck as defendant lawfully
drove it down the highway, fiually stopped the truck and examined dce-
fendant's license, and demanded to examine the contents of the v'ehiice.
The sheriff admitted his only rcason was to investigatc pursuant to the
information he had received. '[he defendant objected but the sheriff per-
sisted and discovered the "moonshine" which was subsequently offered in
evidence at the trial at which defcndant was convicted. The Supreme Court
observed that if halting, searching and seizing are accomplished without a
warrant, the officer must be prepared to show that he had "proper cause"
for his acts or "reasonable belief" or "trustworthy information" that the
xehicle was engaged in the transportation of "moonshine". The showing
made in the instant case, as to the state of sheriff's information at the time
he stopped the truck, fell short of compliance with the above rcquircment,
and, since the sheriff had no valid independent reason for stopping the
truck, the defendant's right to free passage without interruption or search
had been violated.
Circumstantial evidence
In a series of cases, Mosely v. State,'5 Raybon v. State" and Corbin
v. State,'7 the Supreme Court reversed convictions which it found had
13. 75 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
14. 80 So.2d 694 (Fia. 1955).
15. 68 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1953).
16. 75 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1954).
17. 78 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1955).
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been obtained on purely circumstantial evidence which was reasonably con-
sistent with some hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendants.
However, in McElveen v. Statej "n where the question involved the propriety
of admission into evidence of defendant's extra-judicial confession after
the state had established the corpus delecti by circumstantial evidence only,
the court (5 to 2) sustained the conviction.
Entrapment
In Lashley v. State,'8 the facts were that two air force police investi-
gators, both incognito, entered defendant's bar and ordered refreshments.
Then one of the police officers inquired of the defendant, "Where were
all the women?", in reply to which defendant asserted that a certain female
employee "could be had" but the price would have to be "figured out
among yourselves." After a conversation between the officer and the
woman, they left the establishment by auto going to a previously arranged
placed where, after the woman was paid with a marked bill, she was
arrested by a deputy sheriff. Under this and other evidence, the defendant
was convicted of operating a house of ill-fame. At the trial defendant sought
to suppress the evidence of the police officer on the ground of "entrap-
ment." The motion was denied and the defendant was subsequently con-
victed. The Supreme Court sustained the judgment of conviction, stating
that where the evidence shows an intention on the part of the accused
to commit the crime charged, evidence obtained by "entrapment" is
admissible; this is true even though the witnesses acted as decoys. One
who is lured by an officer of the law or other person, for the purpose of
prosecution, into the commission of a crime which he otherwise had no
intention of committing may avail himself of the defense of "entrapment".
Such defense is not available, however, where the officer acted in good
faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting a crime and merely
furnished the opportunity for the commission thereof by one who had the
requisite criminal intent.
Immunity from prosecution
In State ex tel. Mitchell v. Kelly,19 the court in interpreting Florida
Statutes Section 932.29 held that where the subject matter of a grand jury
investigation was "gambling activities", as to which the statute granting
immunity fron prosecution to witnesses who testified applied, the fact
that a related subordinate offense of conspiracy to violate gambling laws
was also involved did not render the statute inapplicable. The witness
would have been free from prosecution for any offense substantially con-
nected with the transaction concerning which he testified, if the testimony
so given constituted a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
him. Boynton v. State ex tel. Mincer"0 involved a suit brought by the
17a. 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
18. 67 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1953).
19. 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
20. 75 So.Zd 211 (Fla. 1954).
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state to enjoin as a nuisance the defendant and others from operating
a lottery and bookmaking business. The state based its case upon the
fact that the defendant had purchased a federal gambling stamp and had
paid an excise tax on his gambling income. The court held that to sustain
the state's position would violate the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination; the injunction order was reversed.
Bail
In State ex rel. Goepel v. Kelly,21 the defendant had been indicted
for murder in the first degree. In a habeas corpus proceeding to determine
if the defendant should be admitted to bail, the trial judge excluded testi-
mony as to the defendant's intoxicated condition. The Supreme Court
held that this was in error since it was the duty of the judge to inquire
into all essential elements of the crime. Since intoxication affects the
intent element evidence concerning intent ought to have been considered.
Former jeopardy
In McLendon v. State22 the trial court had granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial on the ground that the list of witnesses to be used
against him, as requested by the defendant and provided by the prosecution,
was erroneous. At a later trial, the court denied a motion to quash on
grounds of former jeopardy and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In formations
In McDaniel v. Mayo, 23 the defendant was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for a fourth felony conviction. The information charged that the
fourth felony for which the defendant had been convicted was "resisting
arrest". At the time the information was filed, the defendant had not
as yet been sentenced so it could not have been determined whether
confinement in the state penitentiary or the county jail was contemplated,
nor, whether the offense for which he had been convicted was a felony
or a misdemeanor. The fourth felony conviction was held erroneous.
Severances
In Williams v. State,-4 the trial court denied a motion for severance
made at the beginning of the trial, the date for which had been set
several weeks previously. The Supreme Court held that this was not
error since there had been no explanation for the delay in making the
motion.
21. 68 So.2d 351 (a. 1954).
22. 74 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1954).
23. 79 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1955).
24. 69 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1954).
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Withdrawal of plea
The Supreme Court in Kaminski v. State25 held that where a conviction
had been reversed for procedural errors and the case remanded for new
trial, after which the defendants moved to withdraw their plea of not guilty
and to quash the information, refusal to grant the motion was not an
abuse of discretion.
Presence of trial judge
In the course of the trial in the case of McCollum v. State,26 wherein
the defendant was ultimately convicted of murder, the trial judge ordered
a view of the site of the homicide. He was not present at the view. The
question then raised was whether the defendant can waive the judge's
presence at the view by failing to make seasonable objection. The court
held that the voluntary absence of the trial judge at a step in the pro-
ceedings when his presence is required by law is not subject to waiver by
the defendant and constitutes reversible error.
Right to open and close
Green v. State27 involved a prosecution and trial of two defendants
for armed robbery. Both were convicted, and the Supreme Court held that
the refusal of the trial court to permit the one defendant who had offered
no testimony on his own behalf, except his own, to make opening and
closing arguments to the jury, was reversible error.
Comments of state attorney
At the trial in Williams v. State,28 the state attorney, in his closing
statement, observed that if the defendant was found not guilty by reason
of insanity, he would be sent to an insane asylum and soon after being
confined there would be released to commit another homicide. The Supreme
Court held that such an observation was reversible error.
Motion for new trial
In State v. Ramirez29 the Supreme Court reversed a trial judge's order
granting a new trial solely on the basis of a juror's affidavit that he had
failed to register his objection to the verdict because of his erroneous belief
that a majority vote of the jurors was sufficient.
Appeals
Pleger v. State' involved a prosecution for the felony of grand larceny.
At the opening of the new trial, the county solicitor announced that the
state was going to prove petit larceny under the information. Following
25. 72 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1954).
26. 74 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1954).
27. 80 So.2d 676 (Fla, 1955).
28. 68 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1954).
29. 73 Sod 218 (Fla. 1954).
30. 68 So,2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
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conviction, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida and
the Attorney General moved to dismiss on the ground that the court was
without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Supremc Court cntcred
an order of dismissal quoting Section
of Florida, which provides that the
jurisdiction of all misdemeanors.
11, Article V of the Constitution
circuit courts have final appellate
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The 1955 session of the Florida
in the criminal law.
3'
Legislature enactcd several changes
31.Changed the penalty division for robbery (Section 813.011) omitting the
mandatory ten year minimum, so as to permit sentence for imprisonment for lesser
periods of time at the discretion of the court (Chapter 29930).
Increased the penalty for aggravated assault under Section 784.04 to a maximum
of five years or $3,000.00 (Chapter 29709).
Amended the definition of the offense described in Section 801.02 commonly
known as the Child Molestor Act by omitting the word "rape" from the definition
of the offense (Chapter 29923).
Chapter 29881, an act defining sexual psychopathic persons and providing for
the commitment of such persons and the procedure therefor, is new. Attention is
called to that portion of the Act which provides that a person found to be a criminal
sexual psychopathic person may not thereafter be tried, or if already tried, convicted
for the offense with which he originally stood charged.
Chapter 29668 protects a police officer, merchant or merchant's employee
from criminal or civil liability for false arrest or unlawful detention where the detention
is pursuant to "proper cause for believing" that the person detained has unlawfully
taken goods held for sale by the merchant.
Chapter 29654 was enacted, which makes it a felony, punishable by imprisonment
in the State Penitentiary for a period not to exceed five years for any party to an
action who in violation of a court order removes a child from the State.
The legislature adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act dealing
with the machinery for enforcing the legal duty of any person to support another.
whether the obligation arises in this state or another (Chapter 29901).
Chapter 29898 limits the time appeals may be taken by the State in criminal
cases to thirty days from the date of order or sentence from wfiich the appeal is taken.
